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State unemployment insurance (UI) pays benefits that provide par 
tial wage loss replacement for the unemployed. It has been an impor 
tant social insurance program in the U.S. for more than 50 years. Pro 
gram benefits to unemployed workers provide a degree of income securi 
ty for many families and enhance the built-in stability of the 
macroeconomy. Payroll taxes levied on covered employers and paid 
into trust funds maintained at the U.S. Treasury are the sole source 
of funding for most state UI programs. In all states the payroll taxes 
are (partially) experience rated, i.e., benefit claims filed mainly by 
employees on temporary or permanent layoff influence the tax rates 
levied on individual employers. The three main objectives of state UI 
are to provide partial wage loss replacement for individual workers, 
to enhance the automatic or built-in stability of the economy, and to pro 
mote worker attachment with individual employers through experience 
rating of employer taxes (Haber and Murray 1966, chapter 1).
During the 1980s there were two major developments in state 
unemployment insurance; an unprecedented reliance on loans from the 
U.S. Treasury to make benefit payments, and a sizable reduction in 
the availability of program benefits to the unemployed. Both 
developments are related to a problem of inadequate benefit financing, 
which first emerged in the 1970s. Trust fund balances in many states 
have not been large enough to meet the heavy demand for benefits from 
eligible unemployed workers. Individual states in this situation have 
responded in different ways: by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury, 
raising UI taxes, and/or restricting the availability of UI benefits. Among 
the states that have incurred UI debts there has been a sharp increase 
in the pace of debt repayment in the 1980s.
2 Background of the Financing Problem
Loans, Debt and Debt Repayment
For more than 30 years following the creation of the state UI pro 
grams in the mid-1930s, the system of financing benefit payments with 
trust fund reserves functioned quite well. Large trust fund accumula 
tions occurred in all states before and during World War II. Following 
the recessions of 1949, 1954, 1958 and 1960-61, nominal trust fund 
balances were largely restored to pre-recession levels. In almost all states 
fund balances proved adequate when benefit payments rose during a 
later recession.
Prior to the 1970s there were three instances where trust fund balances 
became sufficiently depleted to necessitate state borrowing. Alaska, 
Michigan and Pennsylvania secured loans from the U.S. Treasury in 
the 1950s and early 1960s under loan provisions included in federal 
UI legislation. l In two instances (Michigan and Pennsylvania) the state's 
trust fund balance never actually was exhausted, so that the loans were 
not used to make benefit payments. Alaska, which first borrowed in 
1955, did use its loans to make benefit payments and had a negative 
net fund balance from 1957 to 1963. The loans to all three states were 
eventually repaid after fund balances had been restored to more ade 
quate levels. 2
Although trust fund balances were generally adequate to pay UI 
benefits in this period, there was a gradual erosion of fund adequacy 
caused by increased employment and inflation of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Between the end of 1948 and the end of 1969, for example, the nominal 
level of trust fund reserves for all state UI programs increased from 
$7.6 billion to $12.6 billion. Due to inflation and growth in covered 
employment, however, total payrolls of taxable covered employers in 
creased from $96.1 billion in 1948 to $365.7 billion in 1969. Thus net 
reserves as a share of total covered payrolls declined from 7.9 percent 
in 1948 to 3.4 percent in 1969. 3
Table 1.1 summarizes information on state trust fund balances, loans, 
debt and debt repayment over the period from 1969 to 1989. The table 
shows aggregates of annual data for 53 UI programs; the 50 states plus 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Also in 
cluded in the table are a business cycle indicator (the unemployment
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4 Background of the Financing Problem
rate) and the annual flows of UI benefit payments and tax receipts. In 
each of the four recessionary periods covered by table 1.1 (1970-71, 
1974-75, 1980 and 1982) total benefit payments responded strongly as 
unemployment increased. In annual data the peak-to-trough percentage 
increases in benefit payments for the four recessions were as follows; 
1969 to 1971-149 percent, 1973 to 1975-219 percent, 1979 to 1980-63 
percent and 1981 to 1982-55 percent.
The experience rating of employer UI taxes operates with a lag. Con 
sequently, when benefit outlays rise in recessions there is little immediate 
response of tax receipts, and trust fund balances declined during each 
of the recessionary periods covered by table 1.1. The observed time 
path of the aggregate trust fund balance reflects the functioning of 
unemployment insurance as an automatic stabilizer, i.e., benefit 
payments exceed tax receipts during recessions.
The economic downturn of 1970-71 was rather mild compared to some 
earlier recessions, and fund balances were generally adequate. Although 
benefit outflows from state trust funds more than doubled between 1969 
and 1971, the two-year decline in aggregate reserves was only $2.9 
billion (to $9.7 billion at the end of 1971) and over the next two years 
$1.2 billion was restored. The aggregate trust fund balances of $10.9 
billion at the end of 1973, however, represented only 2.1 percent of 
covered payrolls, down from 3.4 percent at the end of 1969. Also, to 
make benefit payments in 1972 and 1973, Connecticut and Washington 
secured loans from the U.S. Treasury which totaled $94 million. Both 
states experienced very high unemployment between 1970 and 1973 
and their reserves were not adequate to meet the increased demand for 
benefit payments. 4
The downturn of 1973-75 was very severe, with the total unemploy 
ment rate reaching a peak of 8.5 percent in 1975. This recession also 
was characterized by a high rate of wage and price inflation. The 
simultaneous occurrence of high unemployment and high inflation (term 
ed stagflation) caused benefit outlays to increase by more than three 
times between 1973 and 1975 (from $4.1 billion to $13.0 billion). As 
benefit payments rose, net reserves fell sharply and reached $3.1 billion 
by the end of 1975. Borrowing by insolvent UI programs became 
widespread in 1975 and continued for the succeeding three years.
Background of the Financing Problem 5
Table 1.1 shows that 16 different UI programs needed loans in 1975, 
and over the next three years the numbers that borrowed were 23, 20 
and 11, respectively. The volume of loans was actually highest in 1976, 
the year after the business cycle trough but a year of unusually high 
long-term unemployment. 5 UI programs with small and negative net 
reserve balances borrowed $1.9 billion in 1976, as well as $1.5 billion 
in 1975 and $1.3 billion in 1977. Over the entire six-year period from 
1974 through 1979, loans totaling $5.54 billion were disbursed to 25 
different UI programs (22 states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands). The loans represented 10.0 percent of 
total UI benefit payments made during these six years.
During 1978 and 1979, net trust fund reserves increased $7.7 billion. 
Because reserves had been so severely depleted in the preceding reces 
sion, however, net reserves at the end of 1979 totaled only $8.6 billion 
or .90 percent of total covered payrolls. Thus at the end of 1979 the 
aggregate net reserve percentage was roughly 43 percent of what it had 
been at the end of 1973 and only 26 percent of what it had been at the 
end of the previous decade. Given the widespread incidence of reserve 
inadequacy manifest during and after the 1973-75 downturn, it is clear 
that UI programs entered the 1980s in a worse overall financial posi 
tion than they entered the 1970s. In fact, as shown in table 1.1, 13 pro 
grams entered the 1980s with outstanding debts associated with loans 
they had received in the 1970s.
Back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1981-82 caused the demand for 
benefit payments to rise again in the early 1980s. Renewed borrowing 
commenced in 1980 and peaked in 1982 and 1983, the years of highest 
unemployment over the entire post World War n period. Loans during 
1982 and 1983 totaled $11.8 billion, and the number of programs needing 
loans peaked at 28 in 1983. Loans also continued after 1983 with $9.1 
billion of disbursements from the U.S. Treasury between 1984 and 1987. 
Only $.2 billion was borrowed after 1987.
Over the eight years from 1980 to 1987, when borrowing was a com 
mon occurrence, loans totaling $24.0 billion were made to 32 insol 
vent UI programs. By year, the number of states needing loans ranged 
from a low of 8 in 1980 and 1987 to a high of 28 in 1983. The loans 
represented 19.2 percent of total benefits paid by the states to unemployed
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workers in these eight years. Loans were roughly twice as important 
to the states during 1980-87 as they had been during 1974-79 (19.2 
percent of benefits versus 10.0 percent respectively in the two periods).
Because so many UI programs entered the 1980s with low net 
balances, the large benefit outlays of 1982 and 1983 caused aggregate 
net reserves to turn negative and reach a deficit of $5.8 billion at the 
end of 1983. The net indebtedness of the 23 debtor programs at the 
end of 1983 exceeded the positive balances of the other 30 programs 
by almost $6 billion. This situation had never occurred in the entire 
previous history of state UI programs in the United States.
Since 1983 the states have made sustained and large-scale additions 
to net reserves. For the six years 1984 through 1989, net reserves in 
creased by $8.0, $7.9, $5.3, $7.8, $8.7, and $5.0 billion respectively. 
Tax receipts plus interest income have exceeded benefit outlays by 
substantial margins in these years. By the end of 1989 the net fund 
balance across all 53 programs stood at $36.9 billion.
Because the recent build-up of net reserves started from such a low 
level, however, the total of net fund balances at the end of 1989 was 
still modest relative to the total scale of the UI programs. The $36.9 
billion of net reserves represented just 1.9 percent of total covered 
payrolls in 1989. This was higher than the reserve percentage at the 
end of 1979 (.9 percent) but less than the reserve percentage at the end 
of 1973 (2.1 percent) which proved inadequate to fully cover benefit 
payments made during the 1973-75 recession. Thus despite the large- 
scale trust fund accumulations of the 1984-89 period, the level of net 
trust fund balances at the end of 1989 did not seem to be sufficient to 
obviate the need for further loans if another serious recession were to 
follow.
Table 1.1 also shows that debtor programs made large-scale loan 
repayments in each year from 1983 through 1987. Repayments in these 
years were so large, ranging from $3.6 billion to $6.8 billion, that state 
indebtedness was largely eliminated. By the end of 1987, only three 
states had outstanding debts (Michigan, Pennsylvania and Texas) and 
the volume of remaining debt, $2.1 billion, was the lowest since the 
end of 1975. Two years later these numbers had been further reduced 
to one state and $.6 billion of debt. State UI programs during the
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mid-to-late 1980s increased their net reserves substantially while at the 
same time repaying most of their outstanding debt.
The rapid rate of loan repayments observed in the mid-1980s stands 
in sharp contrast to repayment activities of the 1970s. Of the $5.6 billion 
in loans received by UI programs between 1972 and 1979, only $1.8 
billion was repaid during the 1970s and most of this ($1.3 billion) oc 
curred in 1979. Debt repayment of the 1980s has involved "old" debt, 
i.e., debt incurred prior to 1980, as well as more recent debt.
To summarize: (1) Because of inadequate trust fund reserves, many 
state UI programs had to borrow to make benefit payments during and 
after the recessions of 1974-75, 1980 and 1981-82. (2) The volume 
of borrowing has been higher in the 1980s both in absolute dollar amounts 
and relative to the volume of benefit payments. Loans equaled 10.0 per 
cent of benefits from 1974 to 1979 but 19.2 percent of benefits from 
1980 to 1987. (3) Loan repayments have been much more rapid in the 
1980s than they were in the 1970s. (4) Despite large-scale net reserve 
accumulations that occurred between 1984 and 1989, the net reserve 
percentage (net reserves as a percent of total covered payrolls) at the 
end of 1989 was less than it had been at the end of 1973 and many 
states were faced with the threat of insolvency if there were to be another 
recession.
Unemployment and Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits in the 1980s
Coincident with the serious financing problems experienced by UI 
programs in the 1980s, there have also been noticeable cutbacks in the 
availability of program benefits. The cutbacks have affected benefits 
paid under regular UI programs and benefits for long term unemploy 
ment. These cutbacks have occurred despite changes in unemployment 
which, on balance, would be expected to increase (or, at least, not 
decrease) the proportion of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits 
in the 1980s. The changes in unemployment will be briefly reviewed 
before examining the reductions in benefit availability.
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Table 1.2 presents summary information on unemployment for the 
40 years 1948 to 1987 with data grouped into four intervals; 1948-59, 
1960-69,1970-79 and 1980-87. Note that average unemployment rates 
have been higher in the 1970s and 1980s than in earlier years and were 
especially high in the 1980s. The 7.7 percent average unemployment 
rate of 1980-87 is the highest rate experienced for an eight year period 
since World War H. The lowest annual rate for 1980-87 (6.2 percent 
in 1987) just matches the average unemployment rate for the 1970s.
Labor force growth since World War II has been less rapid for adult 
men than for other segments of the working population 16 and older. 
Since adult men experience below average unemployment rates, the 
growing labor force shares of young workers and adult women have 
been a factor tending to raise the overall unemployment rate. Note in 
table 1.2, for example, that while the average unemployment rate for 
men 25 and older was 3.6 percent in both 1948-59 and 1970-79, the 
overall rates were 4.6 percent and 6.2 percent respectively for these 
two periods. From a comparison of the rates for men 25 and older and 
''all others," it is clear that relative unemployment rates for adult men 
declined noticeably over the 1948-1979 period.
In the 1980s, however, the relative unemployment rate as well as the 
absolute rate for adult men increased sharply. In fact, the gains in relative 
unemployment realized by adult men between 1948 and 1979 have been 
completely reversed in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1987, their 
unemployment rate averaged .616 of the rate for all other demographic 
groups, the highest relative rate for adult men of all four periods covered 
by table 1.2. Comparing the 1980s with the 1970s, the average 
unemployment rate for other labor force groups increased by .8 percent 
age points (from 8.5 percent to 9.3 percent), while the rate increased 
by 2.2 percentage points (from 3.6 percent to 5.8 percent) for adult men.
The 1980s have also had a very high incidence of long term unemploy 
ment. Table 1.2 shows that the proportion of workers unemployed 27 
weeks or longer averaged .160 in the 1980s, whereas in the previous 
decades the proportion averaged .110 or less. The proportion 
unemployed 27 weeks or longer has been nearly twice as high in the 
1980s as it was in the period from 1948 to 1959.
Table 1.2 

















































10 Background of the Financing Problem
The three unusual aspects of unemployment in the 1980s (very high 
overall unemployment, high relative unemployment among adult men 
and the high incidence of long term unemployment) are closely inter 
related. Economic developments such as plant closings, industrial 
restructuring, increased import competition and rapidly declining 
unionization appear to be more prevalent in the 1980s than in earlier 
decades and causing large numbers of workers to experience serious 
problems of adjustment in the labor market. Adult men with extensive 
employment histories and long tenure at high-paying jobs appear to be 
particularly susceptible to job displacement and then to experience prob 
lems in securing reemployment.
To illustrate the interrelatedness of the three unemployment 
phenomena, a time series regression analysis was conducted to explain 
the proportion of workers unemployed 27 weeks or longer (PU27). The 
primary explanatory variable was the overall unemployment rate (TUR). 
When unemployment rises, the amount of long-term unemployment also 
rises. The prevalence of long-term unemployment tends to lag behind 
overall unemployment so that the regression specification used the lagged 
unemployment rate (TURL) as well as the current rate. Because adult 
men are often subject to long spells of unemployment and have experienc 
ed variation in their relative unemployment rates, the specification also 
incorporated an unemployment mix variable, unemployment of men 25 
and older as a proportion of total unemployment (UM25TU). Finally, 
the regression included a correction for first order serial correlation 
(RHO).
For the period 1949 to 1979, the fitted equation based on annual data 
was as follows (with t ratios appearing beneath the coefficients):
(1)PU27=-.135 + 1.74TUR+1.67TURL-K169UM25TV-K766RHO 




Equation (1) explained over 90 percent of the variance in the long- 
term unemployment proportion. When the unemployment rate rises, 
long-term unemployment responds strongly with large effects attributable
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to both the current and the lagged unemployment rate. Unemployment 
mix, the proportion accounted for by men 25 and older, also enters equa 
tion (1) significantly, but its effect is quantitatively much smaller than 
the effects of the overall unemployment rate.
Equation (1) made accurate projections of the long-term unemploy 
ment proportion for the 1980s. Over the eight-year interval from 1980 
to 1987 the average projection from the equation was .175, which was 
only .015 higher than the actual average of. 160. 6 The standard devia 
tion of the eight projection errors was .0184 compared to the equation's 
standard error of .0115 for the 1949-1979 estimation period. Most of 
the explanation for the high long-term unemployment proportion of the 
1980s came from the effects of the current and lagged unemployment 
rate. If the adult male unemployment rate had retained its previous 
relative relationship vis a vis other unemployment rates into the 1980s, 
equation (1) then predicted the average long-term unemployment pro 
portion for the 1980s to be .168 rather than .175. About 88 percent 
of the increase in long-term unemployment of the 1980s was attributable 
to the current and lagged effects of higher overall unemployment rates. 7
On balance, the combined effects of the three unusual aspects of 1980s 
unemployment (high overall unemployment, high relative unemploy 
ment among adult men, and the high proportion of long-term unemploy 
ment) should probably have caused the proportion of the unemployed 
claiming UI benefits to rise. In fact, the standard indicator of claims 
activity for the regular UI programs, the ratio of insured unemploy 
ment (IU) to total unemployment (TU), declined noticeably in the 1980s. 8 
Table 1.2 shows that the IU/TU ratio decreased from .402 in the 1970s 
to .337 in the 1980s. Thus in the recent period of very high average 
unemployment the fraction of workers claiming regular state UI benefits 
declined to its lowest level since World War II.
The decline in the IU/TU ratio of the 1980s has been widely noted. 
To document the unexpected component of the decline, a multiple regres 
sion analysis was conducted: For the period from 1948 to 1979, the 
IU/TU ratio was explained with three arguments: the total unemploy 
ment rate (TUR), the total unemployment rate lagged one year (TURL), 
and the demographic mix of unemployment (the proportion of total 
unemployment accounted for by men 25 and older (UM25TU)). When
12 Background of the Financing Problem
unemployment rises, the proportion who are job losers increases and 
this raises the IU/TU ratio. The lagged unemployment rate proxies for 
the effect of exhaustions, and TURL is expected to have a negative ef 
fect on the IU/TU ratio. Adult men are the demographic group most 
likely to collect benefit, 9 so that UM25TU is expected to have a positive 
effect.
The regression result for the 1949-1979 period (with a correction for 
first order serial correlation (RHO) and t ratios beneath the coefficients) 
is shown as equation (2):
(2) IU/TU=.307+1.53TUR - 2.44TURL+.498UM25TU+.440RHO 




All coefficients have expected signs and all are statistically significant. 
Over 80 percent of the variation in the IU/TU ratio is explained by the 
regression.
In equation (2), the net effect of sustained high unemployment is to 
lower the IU/TU ratio, i.e., the negative coefficient on TURL is larger 
than the positive coefficient of TUR. Since long-term unemployment 
and benefit exhaustions have been high in the 1980s, they have tended 
to reduce the IU/TU ratio in this decade. However, the increase in the 
adult male share of total unemployment has tended to raise the ratio.
When equation (2) was used to project the IU/TU ratio for the 
1980-1987 period, the average projected value was .417 or .079 higher 
than the actual average of .337. Between the ten years of the 1970s 
and the eight years of the 1980s, the regression projected the average 
IU/TU ratio to increase by .025 (from .392 to .417), whereas the ac 
tual ratio decreased by .065 (from .402 to .337). There clearly has been 
a major cutback in the availability of regular UI benefits in the 1980s. 
Equation (2) suggests that the actual availability of regular benefits (as 
proxied by the IU/TU ratio) has been about 81 percent of what would 
have been expected based on program performance over the 1949-1979 
period, i.e., the actual IU/TU ratio of .337 is 80.9 percent of the pro 
jected ratio of .417.
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As of mid-1990, a consensus has not been reached as to the cause 
(or, more likely, the causes) for the recent decline in the IU/TU ratio. 
Besides the three factors explicitly included as arguments in equation 
(2) the level of overall unemployment, the lagged level of unemploy 
ment (a proxy for the effects of exhaustions), and the demographic mix 
of unemployment several other factors have also been suggested. Four 
suggested factors are: (1) changes in the industrial distribution of 
unemployment; (2) change in the regional distribution of unemploy 
ment; (3) taxation of UI benefits; and (4) financing problems experienced 
by several large UI program in the 1980s, e.g., Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania.
There have been long-term trends in the shares of employment and 
unemployment by industry since World War II, towards trade, finance 
and services and away from mining, manufacturing and transportation. 
Because fewer unemployed workers claim benefits in the growing in 
dustries relative to the declining industries, the trends can cause the 
IU/TU ratio to decline, and perhaps at an accelerated rate in the 1980s. 10 
A similar argument applies with respect to the geographic distribution 
of unemployment. Generally, IU/TU ratios are lower in southern and 
western states, which are growing more rapidly than northeastern and 
midwestern states. n Program benefits have been taxable under federal 
and state personal income taxes since 1979, and this may have reduced 
the financial incentives for some workers to apply, particularly second 
earners in high-income households. The timing of the changes in the 
tax treatment of UI benefits (partially taxable from 1979 through 1986 
and fully taxable since 1987) roughly matches the period of decline in 
the IU/TU ratio.
Particularly relevant for the concerns of the present investigation is 
the possible contribution of UI financing problems to the decline in 
benefit availability. It is clear in state data that IU/TU ratios have declined 
sharply in several large industrial states that have experienced financ 
ing problems in the 1980s. To the extent that financing problems cause 
individual states to restrict benefit availability (through both formal 
legislation and changes in administrative procedures) avoiding future 
financing problems could contribute positively to UI benefit availabili 
ty in future periods.
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The decline in the IU/TU ratio has been a concern of UI ad 
ministrators, policy makers and worker representatives. To help pro 
vide a systematic explanation for this phenomenon, the UI Service of 
the U.S. Department of Labor has sponsored two research projects, 
the larger and more recent of which was completed in mid-1988 (Burtless 
and Saks 1984; Corson and Nicholson 1988). Of the research completed 
to date, including these two studies, three findings are noteworthy. (1) 
All agree there has been a major decline in the IU/TU ratio in the 1980s. 
The behavior of the ratio in the 1980s represents a sharp break from 
its behavior in earlier decades. (2) A long list of potential contributing 
factors has been identified. Besides factors discussed earlier (benefit 
exhaustions, demographic mix, industrial mix, regional mix, taxation 
of benefits, UI financing problems), changes in the EB program, changed 
treatment of the pension benefit offset and changes in the measurement 
of total unemployment in the CPS have also been suggested. (3) No 
consensus has emerged as to the weighting to place on different factors 
in contributing to the decline in the IU/TU ratio. This third point is 
amply illustrated by the cautionary tone of the conclusions offered in 
the report by Corson and Nicholson (1988, p. 117.)
Indicative of current understanding of the causes for the decline is 
the summary provided by Corson and Nicholson (1988, pp. 117-138). 
The following list of causal factors is taken from table VI. 1 of their 
report. For each factor they supplied a high estimate and a low estimate 
of its percentage contribution to the reduction in the IU/TU ratio be 
tween 1971-79 and 1980-86. In their high estimates, whose sum fully 
accounted for the decline, eight different factors accounted for at least 
10 percent of the total: (1) industry mix of unemployment; (2) geographic 
mix of unemployment; (3) taxation of benefits; (4) changes in the CPS 
measures of total unemployment; and four state-level policy actions 
which restricted eligibility: (5) monetary qualifying requirements; (6) 
voluntary separation denials; (7) misconduct denials; and (8) disquali 
fying income denials. Although Corson and Nicholson did not try to 
determine how many state policy actions of the 1980s were motivated 
by UI financing problems, the types of changes which they identified 
as important are all discussed in chapter 2 of my earlier analysis of debtor 
state policy actions in the 1980-1984 period (Vroman 1986).
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Regardless of the full explanation for the lower IU/TU ratio and the 
contribution attributable to funding problems in the states, the decline 
signals a reduction in UI benefit availability in the 1980s. The decline 
means that state UI is functioning less adequately both in maintaining 
the income of individual unemployed workers and as an automatic 
stabilizer of aggregate economic activity.
Besides the reductions in IU/TU ratios which relate to benefits from 
regular state UI programs, the 1980s have also witnessed reductions 
in benefits targeted on the long-term unemployed. Benefits from the 
federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program were restricted follow 
ing federal legislation of 1981 which changed the way that EB programs 
in the states could be activated. 12 Furthermore, the temporary emergency 
program of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) was smaller and 
was enacted later in the cyclical downturn of the 1980s than the cor 
responding program of Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) that ex 
isted during 1975-1977. Due to differences in the availability of both 
EB and emergency benefits, annualized real per capita benefits for the 
long-term unemployed averaged $5545 in 1975-77, but only $2014 in 
1982-84. Benefits for long-term unemployment declined much more 
in the 1980s than benefits from the regular state UI programs. 13
Indicative of a probable link between UI financing problems and 
benefit availability are state data on changes in IU/TU ratios in the 1980s. 
Between 1980 and 1987 the UI programs in the four large industrial 
states of Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania were continuously 
in debt to the U.S. Treasury. In contrast, four other large states, Califor 
nia, Florida, Massachusetts and New York, have been debt-free in the 
1980s (except for Massachusetts which completed its debt repayments 
in 1980). Table 1.3 focuses on unemployment and insured unemploy 
ment in the two groups of states during the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
For comparative purposes, national data are also included in the table.
Unemployment rates in the four large debtor states have been high 
in the 1980s and substantially higher than they were in the late 1970s. 
The simple average of the TURs for the four during 1980-87 was 9.7 
percent, 3.3 percentage points higher than in 1978-79. In contrast, the 
four debt-free states with large UI fund balances experienced little in 
crease in average unemployment rates in the 1980s; an average increase
Table 1.3 


































































































SOURCE: All data from the U.S. Department of Labor.
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of .2 percentage points compared to the national average increase of 
1.7 percentage points.
Table 1.3 also shows that IU/TU ratios declined sharply in the four 
debtor states. The simple average of the declines between 1978-79 and 
1986-87 was .120, or nearly double the national decline of .066. In 
contrast, the IU/TU ratios were not much different in 1986-87 com 
pared to 1978-79 in the four other states, increasing in California and 
Massachusetts but declining in Florida and New York.
It should not be surprising that IU/TU ratios declined substantially 
in the four debtor states. Each of the four enacted major UI solvency 
legislation in 1982 or 1983 to gain financial advantages in debt 
repayments under terms of the 1983 Social Security Amendments. 14 
Benefit reductions were an important part of the 1982-83 solvency 
legislation in each of the four states. Additionally, three of the four (all 
but Ohio) had previously enacted legislation to reduce benefits in either 
1980 or 1981. These statutory changes undoubtedly contribute to the 
reductions in the IU/TU ratios observed in table 1.3. To date, no one 
has conducted research to precisely estimate how much state legisla 
tion has contributed to the reduced IU/TU ratios in these states. Cor- 
son and Nicholson's (1988) conclusion is that state legislation may ac 
count for about one-third of the general decline in the 1980-86 period 
but their estimates may well have underestimated the size of the effect 
in debtor states like the four included in table 1.3. Further, they do 
not draw attention to the federal financial incentives that prompted the 
state legislation following the 1983 Social Security Amendments.
Changing Patterns of Debt Repayment
After a state UI program borrows from the U.S. Treasury, it will 
pay off the debt by making voluntary repayments or through credit reduc 
tions mandated under statutory provisions of the Federal Unemploy 
ment Tax Act (PUTA). States that make voluntary payments control 
the size and the timing of their payments. In contrast, credit reductions 
under FUTA take place according to a fixed schedule which commences 
after a loan has been outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive years,
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with an initial credit reduction rate (penalty tax rate) of .3 percent of 
taxable payroll. 15 The penalty tax rate rises as unpaid loans have been 
outstanding for longer periods of time. The year-to-year increments in 
penalty tax rates have varied in different past periods and have depend 
ed upon the financial circumstances of individual states.
The penalty taxes that ensure the eventual repayment by debtor states 
are technically tax credit reductions applied against the Federal 
Unemployment Tax (PUT), whose statutory tax rate was 6.2 percent 
in 1990. State UI programs must conform to certain federal standards, 
e.g., in 1990 the tax base must be at least $7,000 per worker, the max 
imum statutory employer tax rate must be at least 5.4 percent of covered 
payroll and the state must have an approved method for experience rating 
individual employers, 16 to receive a PUT tax credit of 5.4 percent which 
reduces the federal tax rate from 6.2 percent to .8 percent. A debtor 
state subject to mandatory loan repayment provisions receives smaller 
PUT tax credits, i.e., 5.1 percent rather than 5.4 percent in the first 
year of mandatory debt repayment. The credit reductions that ensure 
debt repayment are applied at a single flat rate to all employers in the 
debtor state.
The distinction between voluntary and mandatory debt repayment is 
somewhat artificial since a state can avoid mandatory repayments in 
a given year if the size of its voluntary repayment equals or exceeds 
the mandatory repayment required for that year, while at the same time 
satisfying other statutory financial requirements. In the 1980s there were 
four financial requirements: (1) repay all current year loans by November 
1st; (2) repay any PUT penalty tax (credit reduction) that was due for 
the current year; (3) not borrow from the U.S. Treasury during the next 
12 months; and, (4) have a trust fund balance sufficient to pay at least 
three months of benefits (for the November-January period). If a state 
satisfied these requirements and wanted to make the current year's repay 
ment with experience-rated taxes, it could use the proceeds from a pro 
portional supplemental tax surcharge rather than do nothing and be sub 
ject to a PUT penalty tax (credit reduction).
The mandatory debt repayment provisions under FUTA were not con 
sistently applied to debtor states in the 1970s. Federal legislation enacted 
in 1976 and in 1978 deferred the full implementation of the repayment
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provisions until 1980. In 1980, when the provisions did become fully 
operative, nine states were subject to penalty taxes. Penalty tax receipts 
are payable in the year following the year when they accrue.
Loans to insolvent UI programs were interest free in all periods 
through March 31, 1982. Under provisions of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, however, loans made after March 1982 have 
been interest bearing. Interest is charged on loans that are not fully repaid 
in the same fiscal year they are received. The rate of interest charged 
for these advances is the same as the interest rate earned by states with 
positive trust fund balances, but subject to a maximum of 10 percent 
per year. The imposition of interest charges began just as the economy 
was experiencing a major recession. Consequently, most loans made 
in the 1980s have been interest bearing loans.
Because of the large volume of loans required by the states in the 
early 1980s it became clear that debt repayment would place serious 
financial burdens on many states with large UI debts. To ease some 
of these financial burdens federal UI legislation enacted in 1981, 1982 
and 1983 included provisions which lessened PUT penalty taxes (credit 
reduction rates), and modified the terms of repayment and the interest 
charges on loans. 17
It is now clear that charging interest on loans has prompted impor 
tant changes in loan repayment behavior. Since 1983, debtor states have 
been very prompt in repaying debt, particularly interest-bearing debt.
Table 1.4 summarizes annual data on loans, debt, and debt repay 
ment in the 1970s and 1980s, with interest-free advances distinguished 
from interest-bearing advances. Of the $29.84 billion in loans secured 
in these years, $10.47 billion was interest-free and $19.36 billion was 
interest-bearing. The outstanding debt remaining at the end of 1989 total 
ed only $.60 billion, and none of it was interest-bearing debt. Thus, 
by the end of the period covered by table 1.4, all the interest-bearing 
loans had been repaid compared to 94.3 percent of the interest-free loans. 
Despite the fact that all interest-free advances were made prior to April 
1982 and all interest-bearing advances were made after April 1982, the 
latter were fully repaid at the end of 1989.
Table 1.4 also reveals significant contrasts in the methods used to 
repay the two types of loans. Statutory debt repayment requirements
Table 1.4
Summary of State UI Debt and Debt Repayment Activities, 1969-1989
(in $ billions)








































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: All data from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
NA=not applicable. There were no interest bearing loans before 1982, no interest free loans after 1982, and no UI debt during 1969-1971. Repayments 
rates are measured as the ratio of credit reductions plus voluntary repayments in the current year to the sum of debt outstanding at the start of the year 
plus loans received during the year.
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and financial incentives have combined to produce the repayment pat 
terns observed in the table. Debt repayment provisions require that when 
a state makes a voluntary repayment, it must be applied to the most 
recent advance, whereas PUT penalty taxes (credit reductions) are ap 
plied to the earliest of any outstanding advances. Thus when states made 
voluntary repayments in the 1980s, the repayment typically applied to 
an interest-bearing loan. Financial incentives (avoidance of interest 
payments) also influenced the states to repay these loans most rapidly.
Note in table 1.4 that the total dollar amount of credit reductions 
associated with interest-free loans exceeded the dollar amount of volun 
tary repayments of such loans ($5.85 billion versus $4.02 billion). Credit 
reductions were the larger of the two means of repayment in all years 
since 1981, with the exception of 1987 when the two are nearly equal 
in size at a level of $.93 billion.
In contrast, nearly all repayments of interest-bearing advances were 
voluntary repayments ($19.08 billion versus only $.29 billion in credit 
reductions). To minimize interest charges and to avoid such charges 
altogether, the states paid off these loans very rapidly. In fact, only 
in 1982 and 1983 did the volume of interest-bearing loans exceed the 
volume of voluntary repayments of such loans.
The final columns of table 1.4 summarize the pace of loan repay 
ment activities. Annual loan repayment rates are defined as the ratio 
of repayments (credit reductions plus voluntary repayments) to the sum 
of debt outstanding at the start of the year plus new loans received dur 
ing the year. The loan repayment rates were much higher in the mid 
1980s than in earlier years. Repayment rates for all loans averaged .045 
from 1972 to 1979, .060 from 1980 to 1982, and .445 from 1983 to 
1989. The sharp increase in repayment rates coincides with the change 
in the interest treatment of UI loans. The first year when interest 
payments were due for unpaid interest bearing loans was 1983. 18
Table 1.4 also shows the repayment rates for interest-free loans and 
for interest-bearing loans. For interest-free loans, the simple average 
repayment rate over the entire 1972-1989 period was .140. The repay 
ment rate for these loans exceeded .50 in one year (1987), and it ex 
ceeded .25 in three other years (1979, 1986 and 1988). In contrast, 
the simple average of the repayment rates for interest-bearing loans was
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606 from 1982 to 1988, and the repayment rate exceeded .60 in the 
last five years 1984 to 1988.
The lower rate of loan repayments observed for the 1970s was due 
in part to the fact that loans were interest-free. In an economic environ 
ment that had substantial price and wage inflation, each year that 
repayments were deferred meant that repayment would be less burden 
some to the debtor state. Two other factors that reduced loan repay 
ment rates were also operative in the 1970s. First, as noted previously, 
the full operation of the automatic repayment schedule for PUT penal 
ty taxes (credit reductions) was twice deferred in the 1970s. Second, 
discussions of cost reinsurance and debt forgiveness gave debtor states 
perverse incentives to slow their rate of debt repayment. A state would 
probably need to have outstanding debt to realize any financial advan 
tages from cost reinsurance or outright debt forgiveness.
As noted, during most of the 1980s debtor states faced statutory re 
quirements as well as financial incentives to repay loans quickly. In 
terest costs would be reduced or completely avoided if interest-bearing 
debt was repaid rapidly, and PUT penalty taxes were levied consistently 
on states with debt more than two years old. Table 1.4 shows that even 
interest-free loans were repaid more rapidly after 1982 than they were 
in earlier years.
As UI programs developed experience with interest-bearing debt since 
1982, a clearcut pattern of debt repayment activities has emerged. States 
that incur debt repay interest-bearing loans very rapidly. If they also 
happen to have outstanding interest-free loans from earlier periods, these 
are repaid slowly. The slowest permissible repayment rate for old debt 
is to pay mandated PUT penalty taxes. By repaying interest-free debt 
slowly, a state can accumulate a larger trust fund balance and lower 
the risk of needing additional interest-bearing loans in the event of a 
recession. Voluntary repayments of interest-free debt have usually taken 
place only after all interest-bearing debt was repaid and after the fund 
balance was restored to a level deemed adequate for most contingencies.
Because table 1.4 combines repayment data from all debtor states the 
repayment patterns are not as obvious as when data from individual 
states are examined. Table 1.5 and 1.6 show loans and repayments by 
state for individual years in the 1980s; table 1.5 covers interest-bearing
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loans and table 1.6 covers interest-free loans. Considering the carryover 
of debt from the 1970s as well as loans received in the 1980s, these 
tables identify 30 UI programs with experience in repaying interest- 
bearing debt and 21 with experience in repaying interest-free debt in 
the 1980s. 19
In table 1.5 there are 100 state-year observations for interest-bearing 
loans, i.e., times when states received loans. The table shows that for 
most of these years the states also made loan repayments within the 
same year. There are only 13 state-year observations where a loan was 
received but no repayment was made, and six occurred in 1982. Many 
programs borrowed in these years, but to minimize interest costs they 
repaid the loans very quickly.
Interest-bearing loans were usually completely repaid within a few 
years of their initial receipt. Table 1.5 illustrates this with indicators 
of years when states experienced PUT penalty taxes (credit reductions). 
To activate a penalty tax assessment, an unpaid interest-bearing loan 
(like other loans) must have been unpaid in the two consecutive January 
Ists following its receipt. The penalty tax is then assessed in the next 
year. Since the first interest-bearing loans were secured in 1982, the 
first penalty taxes were collected in 1985. There are only nine state- 
year observations where penalty taxes are indicated (five in 1985, three 
in 1986, and one in 1987). As noted previously, all states except Texas 
had completely repaid their interest-bearing loans by the end of 1987. 
Texas completed its repayments in 1988.
The usual method for making voluntary repayments is for the pro 
gram to debit an amount from its trust fund balance maintained at the 
U.S. Treasury. This reduces the program's gross reserves but leaves 
its net reserves unchanged. In 1987, however, two states (Louisiana 
and West Virginia) issued special unemployment insurance bonds and 
used the proceeds to pay off their interest-bearing debt. These programs 
made their own loan arrangements rather than relying on the U.S. 
Treasury to cover their trust fund debt. The states expect to pay off 
the loans after their trust fund balances have been increased to more 
adequate levels. This innovative method of bond financing also illustrates 
the strong aversion felt by debtor UI programs to long-term indebtedness 
to the U.S. Treasury when the debt is interest bearing. 20
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Table 1.5 

































































































































SOURCE: Based on loan and repayment data from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Key: L=Loan, V=Voluntary Loan Repayment, C=FUT Credit Reduction, V-F=Final Loan 
Repayment
Table 1.6 
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SOURCE: Based on loan and repayment data from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Key: X=Debtor State at the end of 1979, L=Loan, C=FUT Credit Reduction, C-F=FUT Credit Reduction and Final Payment, V=Voluntary Loan
Repayment, V-F=Final Loan Repayment
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Debtor state behavior regarding interest-free debt from the 1970s and 
early 1980s stands in vivid contrast to the interest-bearing debt. Table 
1.6 documents the repayment of interest-free debt through 1989. As 
noted earlier, just two states (Michigan and Pennsylvania) still had 
interest-free debt at the end of 1987, while Michigan was the lone re 
maining debtor state at the end of 1989.
Penalty taxes to repay old unpaid loans are applied to the oldest outstan 
ding loans. Note in table 1.6 that at the end of 1979, 13 states had old 
debt, incurred mainly between 1975 and 1978. Two completed their 
debt repayments in 1980 (Massachusetts and Montana), but the other 
eleven did not and were subject to PUT penalty taxes (levied in 1981). 
Similarly, four states that were debt free at the end of 1979 but that 
borrowed in 1980 (Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and West Virginia) were 
subject to penalty taxes in 1983. Altogether there are 85 state-year obser 
vations in table 1.6 where penalty taxes were levied. There are just four 
state-year observations where the only type of repayment was a volun 
tary payment. For most of the observations involving penalty taxes (68 
of 85), the credit reduction represented the minimum that the state could 
repay while satisfying federal UI conformity requirements. Penalty taxes 
totaled $5.85 billion between 1980 and 1989.
The number of states that made voluntary repayments of interest-free 
debt was small in each year covered by table 1.6. There are only 23 
state-year observations'in the table where voluntary debt repayments 
occurred. The annual dollar amounts of the voluntary repayments in 
the 1980s are dominated by one or a few states making final payments 
to completely repay their interest-free debts. Note in table 1.6 that there 
were no final repayments in 1981 or 1982. For the other years covered 
by the table, it is instructive to summarize the dollar volume of final 
repayments and to compare it to the total dollar volume of voluntary 
repayments. The states and payments by year were as follows: (1980) 
Massachusetts and Montana - $239 million out of $247 million; (1983) 
Maine - $4 million out of $6 million; (1984) Arkansas, Delaware, Ken 
tucky, Missouri and Rhode Island - $310 million out of $310 million, 
(1985) New Jersey - $209 million out of $209 million; (1986) Con 
necticut, Puerto Rico, Vermont, and Wisconsin - $174 million out of 
$340 million; (1987) Illinois, Ohio, and West Virginia - $785 million
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out of $933 million; and (1988) Pennsylvania - $198 million out of $587 
million. For practical purposes, voluntary repayments of interest-free 
debt in the 1980s have occurred only as the final act in repaying this 
type of UI debt. Over the eight years from 1980 to 1987, voluntary 
repayments made in the last year of indebtedness accounted for $1.72 
billion or 84 percent of the $2.05 billion of voluntary repayments of 
interest-free debt.
The preceding discussion of debt repayment patterns in the 1970s and 
1980s can be summarized in a few sentences. Debt repayment occur 
red at a very slow rate in the 1970s but then speeded up dramatically 
in the 1980s after new loans started to carry interest charges. Even during 
the 1980s, there continued to be a major contrast in debtor state treat 
ment for interest-free and interest-bearing debt. In most years, in most 
debtor states, interest-bearing debt was repaid rapidly while interest- 
free debt was repaid as slowly as possible. Large voluntary repayments 
of interest-free debt typically occurred only at the end of the debt repay 
ment process.
State UI Funding Strategies
The financing problems encountered by many state UI programs in 
the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to a number of factors. Most 
prominent are (1) the high overall levels of unemployment experienc 
ed since 1970; (2) the unusual regional patterns of unemployment in 
the past two decades; (3) the unexpected costs of federal-state Extend 
ed Benefits (EB); (4) asymmetric responses of taxes and benefits to high 
inflation (taxes are less responsive than benefits in many states); and 
(5) unfortunate timing of benefit liberalizations in selected states. These 
causes are discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2 of Vroman (1986). 
Although many of the earlier adverse economic developments may be 
less prevalent in future years, there is no assurance that the future 
economic environment will be free of recessions and/or inflation.
If states are to avoid a repetition of their recent borrowing and debt 
experiences, they will need to satisfy one or more of the following three 
conditions: accumulate a "large" trust fund, have a UI tax system that
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responds quickly and strongly to reductions in trust fund balances 
(perhaps supplemented by a response of benefit payments as well), or 
be willing to enact solvency legislation when trust fund balances decline 
to what are deemed unacceptably low levels. The three conditions are 
not mutually exclusive. To the extent that the first two are present  
having a large trust fund and a responsive tax (and benefit) system  
the third can be avoided enacting additional tax increases (and/or benefit 
reductions) in a future recession.
It is now clear that one alternative funding strategy followed by several 
UI programs in the 1970s and early 1980s (willingness to incur substan 
tial debt for a sustained period) is no longer attractive. The charging 
of interest on new loans caused debtor states to make prompt repayments 
of loans secured after March 1982. Since interest-free debt is now largely 
paid off and future loans will carry interest charges, it is probable that 
any future loans to states would also be repaid promptly. Thus in a future 
recession states would be expected to avoid debt and to repay quickly 
any recently-incurred debt.
In the 1982-1984 period when trust fund balances were generally low 
and new loans carried interest charges, several states enacted major 
solvency legislation. Vroman (1986, chapter 2) provides details of this 
legislation in 10 large debtor states. A question to be addressed in chapter 
4 is the extent to which similar state UI legislative activity could be 
avoided in a future recession if trust fund balances were larger and/or 
if the UI tax (and benefit) system were more responsive. Before under 
taking that analysis, however, chapter 2 reviews the existing literature 
on trust fund adequacy and chapter 3 introduces the simulation model 
to be used in the analysis of fund adequacy and tax responsiveness.
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NOTES
1. The terms of debt repayment requirements for U.S. Treasury loans are discussed later in this 
chapter.
2.The periods when the three states had loans outstanding were as follows; Alaska from 1955 
to 1967, Michigan from 1958 to 1967 and Pennsylvania from 1959 to 1966.
3. For more discussion of the decline in the relative size of trust fund reserves prior to 1970 see 
chapter 1 and table 1.1 in Vroman (1986).
4. Estimates of annual total unemployment rates (TURs) based on the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) are available for 27 states from 1970 to 1975 and for all states starting in 1976. For 
Washington and Connecticut, the TURs from 1970 to 1973 were as follows: Washington - 9.2 
percent, 10.1 percent, 9.5 percent and 7.9 percent; Connecticut 5.7 percent, 8.4 percent, 8.6 
percent and 6.3 percent. Washington's TUR was the highest of the 27 state TURs in each of the 
four years, while Connecticut's TUR ranked sixth, third, second and fifth highest respectively 
in these years.
5. The number of persons unemployed 27 weeks and longer in 1976 averaged 1.35 million or 
1.40 percent of the civilian labor force. The highest previous percentages were 1.20 percent in 
1975, 1.14 percent in 1961 and .99 percent in 1958.
6. The projections were made using actual values from the 1980s for the three principal explanatory 
variables from equation (1) (TUR, TURL and UM25TU) and the error term for 1979 from the 
fitted equation which was allowed to decay exponentially.
7. A regression of the adult male unemployment rate on the total unemployment rate, the unemploy 
ment rate for "all others," a time trend, and a serial correlation correction was fitted from 1949 
to 1979 and then used to project the adult male rate from 1980 to 1987. The projected unemploy 
ment rate averaged 5.09 percent or .69 percentage points less than the actual average of 5.78 
percent. When the counterfactual unemployment mix variable was then used in equation (1) to 
project the long-term unemployment proportion, the average for the 1980s was .168 compared 
to .115 for the 1970s.
8. Insured unemployment includes some UI claimants who are not presently receiving benefits- 
people serving waiting periods and (in some states) disqualification periods. In 1986 the number 
of beneficiaries represented 88.2 percent of insured unemployment.
9. For example, in the two years 1976 and 1977 thelU/TU ratio averaged .382. Among four 
major demographic groups, however, the IU/TU ratio for these years was as follows; all persons 
16-19 .082, all persons 20-24 .288, women 25 and older .448, and men 25 and older .650.
10. For example, among unemployed wage and salary workers in the private sector, the average 
IU/TU ratio in 1976 and 1977 was .532. The corresponding averages for seven broad industries 
were as follows: mining .880, construction .753, manufacturing  .633, transportation .638, 
wholesale and retail trade .372, finance .471 and services (except for private household 
services) .444.
11. For example, the national average of the IU/TU ratio in 1976 and 1977 was .382. The cor 
responding averages for the nine Census Divisions were as follows: New England .433, Mid 
Atlantic .441, East North Central .417, West North Central .420, Mountain .319, Pacific  
.407, South Atlantic .297, East South Central .376 and West South Central .262.
12. See Vroman (1990) for one discussion of these changes. The national EB insured unemploy 
ment rate trigger was eliminated, state threshold tnggers were raised, and the computation of 
the state triggers was modified by removing EB recipients from the calculations. All three changes 
had the effect of reducing the availability of EB benefits.
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13. The calculation summed EB plus emergency benefits in each year of both three-year periods, 
deflated by the personal consumption deflator from the National Income Accounts and divided 
by the number unemployed 27 weeks or longer in the same year. Cutbacks in long-term benefits 
are important to the working poor. Vroman (1990) compares the poverty-reducing effectiveness 
of UI benefits in 1976 and 1983 and finds that UI benefits caused smaller reductions in poverty 
among the long-term unemployed in 1983.
14. This 1983 federal legislation is described in chapter 1 of Vroman (1986) and the solvency 
legislation enacted in the four states is detailed in chapter 2 of the same volume, along with the 
legislation in six other large debtor states.
15. The basic framework which determines the repayment of UI debt has been present in the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act since 1954. Repayment provisions were modified three times 
by federal legislation enacted between 1981 and 1983. For details of this legislative history see 
chapter 1 in Vroman (1986).
16. There are 35 conformity requirements that state UI Programs must satisfy, 21 specified by 
Section 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 14 specified by Title HI of the Social 
Security Act. A full listing of these requirementsis given in Appendix VHI of U.S. General Ac 
counting Office (1988).
17. The three pieces of federal legislation were the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the Social Security Amendments of 
1983. The provisions in these bills affecting UI loans and debt repayment are described in chapter 
1 of Vroman (1986).
18. Technically, the first interest payments were due on October 1, 1982 for 1982 interest-bearing 
loans not repaid by September 30, 1982. The payment of interest for 1982, however, could be 
deferred until 1983.
19. There are 15 UI programs with experience in the 1980s in repaying both types of debt: Con 
necticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
20. Part of the motivation for issuing state debt was financial, i.e., the interest rates payable on 
state bonds was expected to be lower than the interest rates charged on U.S. Treasury loans.
